Linux Today: Linux News On Internet Time.

More on LinuxToday

SuSE Security Announcement: xli/xloadimage

Jul 25, 2001, 04:14 (0 Talkback[s])
Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2001 19:49:31 +0200 (CEST)
From: Thomas Biege <>


                        SuSE Security Announcement

        Package:                xli/xloadimage
        Announcement-ID:        SuSE-SA:2001:024
        Date:                   Tuesday, July 24th 2001 17:30 MEST
        Affected SuSE versions: (6.0, 6.1, 6.2,) 6.3, 6.4, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2
        Vulnerability Type:     remote system compromise
        Severity (1-10):        3
        SuSE default package:   no
        Other affected systems: yes

        Content of this advisory:
        1) security vulnerability resolved: xli
           problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information
        2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds
        3) standard appendix (further information)


1)  problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information

  xli, aka xloadimage, a image viewer for X11 is used by Netscape's plugger
  to display TIFF-, PNG- and Sun-Raster-images. The plugger configuration
  file is /etc/pluggerrc.
  Due to missing boundary checks in the xli code a buffer overflow could be
  triggered by an external attacker to execute commands on the victim's
  system. An exploit is publically available.

  SuSE Linux is not vulnerable by default because of the different names.
  On SuSE Linux the command is called xli, while the plugger uses xloadimage.
      exits: xloadimage -quiet -windowid $window $file

  If you have xloadimage installed on your system on your own, you should
  comment out the lines in /etc/pluggerrc, that contain xloadimage, for
  a temporary fix.

  Otherwise update the packages for your system.
  Nevertheless, it's recommended to leave the xloadimage entry in
  /etc/pluggerrc commented out, because of the potential risk the
  xloadimage code causes.

  i386 Intel Platform:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    Sparc Platform:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    AXP Alpha Platform:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    PPC Power PC Platform:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:

    source rpm:


2)  Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds:

  - dqs has found an exploitable buffer overflow bug in
    the dsh program from the dqs package on SuSE Linux distributions.
    To workaround the problem, do "chmod -s /usr/bin/dsh" and change the
    files /etc/permissions* to reflect the change. If you do not need the
    dqs package, then deinstall it (rpm -e dqs).
    Packages for most of the supported SuSE Linux distributions are
    available at the usual location
    for download and installation/update. Do not forget to change the files
    /etc/permissions* to remove the suid-bit from the dsh program. Please
    note that we will not issue a dedicated security announcement for this
    specific bug.

  - pcp
    Paul Starzetz discovered a security weakness in the setuid root program
    /usr/share/pcp/bin/pmpost. The common library in pcp trusts the
    environment that has been supplied by the user, regardless of privileged
    execution or not. By consequence, a user can specify the configuration
    file and therefore write to files owned by root. The problem is not based
    on insecurely following symlinks as stated by Paul Starzetz.
    The pcp package is not installed by default in SuSE Linux distributions.
    We have provided update packages for the SuSE Linux distributions version
    7.1 and 7.2 that remove the setuid bit from the pmpost binary. Versions
    before SuSE-7.1 were not affected because the setuid bit was not set.
    We thank Keith Owens and Mark Goodwin from Silicon Graphics for responding
    quickly and for publishing a new version of the pcp package which will
    be included in future releases of the SuSE Linux distribution. For more
    information see the /usr/share/doc/packages/pcp directory of your SuSE
    Linux installation after installing the update package, or go to
    obtained from .
    Please note that there will not be a dedicated security announcement
    for this specific bug.

  - fetchmail (fetchml)
    New fetchmail packages are available on the ftp server. The packages
    cure a buffer overflow that can be exploited by sending a victim a
    specially designed email, waiting for the victim's fetchmail program
    to pick up the email. We are preparing a security announcement for this

  - openssh
    update packages for the openssh package after (and including) SuSE-6.4
    are available on our ftp servers ftp (for < 7.1) or
    ftp (for >= 7.1). We are currently checking for a non-security
    related irregularity in sshd's behaviour under faulty setup conditions.

  - exim
    SuSE Linux distributions do not contain the exim Mail Transport Agent
    (See for details) and are therefore not susceptible
    to the recently found security-related bugs.

  - webmin
    SuSE Linux distributions do not contain the webmin administration
    web frontend (See for details) and are therefore
    not vulnerable to the recently found security-related problems in the


3)  standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information

  - Package authenticity verification:

    SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
    the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
    to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
    sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
    the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
    independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
    file or rpm package:
    1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
    2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.

    1) execute the command
        md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm>
       after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors.
       Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
       announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
       cryptographically signed (usually using the key,
       the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
       We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the
       email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
       the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
       list software.
       Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
       announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
       and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
       md5 sums for the files are useless.

    2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
       of an rpm package. Use the command
        rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>
       to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the
       filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
       package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm
       package file.
        a) gpg is installed
        b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
           key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
           ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
           signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
           that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving
           this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
           running the command (do "su -" to be root):
            gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
           SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
           key "" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
           the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
           is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
           and at .

  - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
        -   general/linux/SuSE security discussion.
            All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to
        -   SuSE's announce-only mailing list.
            Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list.
            To subscribe, send an email to

    For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
    send mail to:
        <> or
        <> respectively.

    SuSE's security contact is <>.
    The <> public key is listed below.

    The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
    provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
    it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the
    authenticity of the text.
    SuSE GmbH makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
    to the information contained in this security advisory.

  Thomas Biege, SuSE GmbH, Schanzaeckerstr. 10, 90443 Nuernberg
  E@mail:      Function: Security Support & Auditing
  "lynx -source | pgp -fka"
  Key fingerprint = 51 AD B9 C7 34 FC F2 54  01 4A 1C D4 66 64 09 84

To unsubscribe, e-mail:
For additional commands, e-mail: