SUSE Linux Advisory: rsync
Aug 17, 2004, 15:14 (0 Talkback[s])
SUSE Security Announcement
Date: Monday, Aug 16th 2004 16:00 MEST
Affected products: 8.1, 8.2, 9.0, 9.1 SUSE Linux Database Server,
SUSE eMail Server III, 3.1 SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8, 9 SUSE
Linux Firewall on CD/Admin host SUSE Linux Connectivity Server SUSE
Linux Office Server
Vulnerability Type: remote system compromise
Severity (1-10): 2
SUSE default package: no
Cross References: http://samba.org/rsync/#security_aug04
Content of this advisory:
- security vulnerability resolved:
- insufficient pathname sanitizing problem description
- special instructions and notes
- package location and checksums
- pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds:
- standard appendix (further information)
1) problem description, brief discussion
The rsync-team released an advisory about a security problem in
rsync. If rsync is running in daemon-mode and without a chroot
environment it is possible for a remote attacker to trick rsyncd
into creating an absolute pathname while sanitizing it. As a result
it is possible to read/write from/to files outside the rsync
SUSE LINUX ships the rsync daemon with a chroot environment
enabled by default, therefore the default setup is not
As a temporary workaround we suggest to keep the chroot-option
of rsyncd enabled or to avoid the daemon-mode and use SSH as
transport channel if possible.
3) special instructions and notes
After applying the update, all instances of the rsyncd should be
closed and the rsync daemon should be restarted. Please execute the
following command as root: 'rcrsyncd restart'
4) package location and checksums
Please download the update package for your distribution and
verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this
announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv
file.rpm" to apply the update.
Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The
packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web.
SUSE Linux 9.1:
SUSE Linux 9.0:
SUSE Linux 8.2:
SUSE Linux 8.1:
SUSE Linux 9.1:
SUSE Linux 9.0:
5) Pending vulnerabilities in SUSE Distributions and
- KDE The KDE libs package contained two occurrences of insecure
handling of temporary files in the mcoputils code (Thanks to Andrew
Tuitt for reporting this to us) and in the dcopserver code. These
two bugs can be exploited locally to remove and/or overwrite files
with the privileges of the user running a vulnerable KDE
application. A bug in the kdebase3 package allows the content of
unrelated browser windows to be modified. This issue may be used to
trick users into entering sensitive informations on a malicious
web-site. New packages are available on our FTP servers.
- mozilla/firefox We are currently testing new mozilla/firefox
packages that include several fixes for security-related bugs. New
packages are available on our FTP servers (for some products we
have to delay the delivery of the update package).
- xine-lib This update of xine fix' a buffer overflow in the vcd
input source identifier. This buffer overflow is independent of the
media format. The bug can be used to execute arbitrary commands.
New packages are available on our FTP servers.
- opera The web-browser opera is affected by several security
bugs. Due to the nature of this package we are not able to provide
security updates in a timely manner and have to wait for binary
packages to be published by "Opera Software".
- acroread iDEFENSE reported a buffer overflow and insecure
handling of shell meta-chars in acroread code. We depend on the
release of a new binary package by Adobe. An update will be
available as soon as possible.
6) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional
- Package authenticity verification:
SUSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers
all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable
and important to the free and open source software community, many
users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its
content before installing the package. There are two verification
methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the
authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package:
- md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed)
- using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.
- execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after
you downloaded the file from a SUSE ftp server or its mirrors.
Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in
the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums
is cryptographically signed (usually using the key firstname.lastname@example.org), the checksums show
proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to
subscribe to security lists which cause the email message
containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature
does not match after transport through the mailing list software.
Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
md5 sums for the files are useless.
- rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the
authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig
<file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where
<file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have
downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only
target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites:
- gpg is installed
- The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of
this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that
is used by SUSE in rpm packages for SUSE Linux by saving this
announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command
(do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt |
gpg --import SUSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter
install the key "email@example.com"
upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is
installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the
top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de
- SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested
party may subscribe:
For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
send mail to:
SUSE's security contact is <firstname.lastname@example.org
public key is listed below.
The information in this advisory may be distributed or
reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way.
In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows
proof of the authenticity of the text.
SUSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with
respect to the information contained in this security advisory.
Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <email@example.com>
pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <firstname.lastname@example.org>